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 Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and Default Risk  
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Using a cross-country sample of mergers and acquisitions, we examine the role of cultural, 
institutional, geographic and managerial factors on post-merger default risk. We find that 
managerial factors and geographic distance play significant roles in affecting post-merger default 
risk. Our results suggest that, in contrast to a prior research on domestic mergers, the effects of 
managerial factors in cross border mergers on default risk are consistent with the information flow 
and the overvaluation hypotheses. We do not find any evidence indicating the relevance of 
institutional quality and culture on default risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been very popular in recent times accounting for 45% 
of total merger volume in 2007 (Erel, et al. 2012). The determinants of and motivations for cross-
border transactions are different from domestic mergers due to cross–border effects. In these 
mergers, the distance of country–level characteristics between two countries, such as the quality of 
accounting disclosure, culture, geography, corporate governance and bilateral trade are reported to 
have significant roles (Ahern, et al., forthcoming; Erel et al., 2012). Firms engage in cross-border 
mergers increase value through several ways. Firms can create value by acquiring targets in 
countries with weaker governance regimes, (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Bris and cabolis, 
2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) or by purchasing targets in related industries (Dos Santos, Errunza 
and Miller, 2008). The opportunity to create value via cross-border mergers can also arise from 
wealth effects and valuation error. Froot and Stein (1991) suggest that a stronger domestic 
currency relative to other foreign currencies motivates firms to engage in cross border mergers as 
the price of foreign targets become less expensive. Similarly, when the stock price of an acquirer is 
overvalued, it is more likely to issue shares to acquire (undervalued) targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). 
A recent study suggests that mergers may affect not only firm value, but also firm default risk 
(Furfine and Rosen, 2011). Using a US sample of domestic mergers, Furfine and Rosen (2011) 
document that domestic mergers, on average, increase default risk of the acquiring firm. They find 
that idiosyncratic risk, past stock performance, valuation error, type of payment and agency 
problem are related to default risk in domestic mergers. The impact of cross-border mergers on 
firms’ default risk however, has not been comprehensively examined.  
In this paper we extend Furfine and Rosen (2011) by observing the effects of cross-border 
mergers on a firm’s default risk. Prior studies on cross border mergers usually focus on US 
acquirer firms or total (US and non US) firms. US firms have different firm- and country-level 
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characteristics (for example, in terms of corporate governance, cultural and accounting regimes) 
from those of non US firms. We therefore explore this issue by decomposing our sample into three 
sub samples: US acquirers vs. non US targets, non US acquirers vs. US targets and non US 
acquirers vs. non US targets. Splitting our sample into these sub samples sheds further light on the 
effects of cross-border mergers on default risk.   
We find that, on average, cross-border mergers reduce default risk, but the determinants are 
mostly different from those in domestic mergers and in each sub sample. We find evidence 
consistent with overvaluation of US firms may lead managers to make risk increasing mergers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). We also find that idiosyncratic risk is negatively related to default 
risk in two of the sub samples. This is inconsistent the results for domestic mergers (Furfine and 
Rosen, 2011), but consistent with the view that idiosyncratic risk is positively related to more 
efficient corporate investment (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Firm 
size is negatively related to firm risk for US and non US acquirers, but not for non US firms 
acquiring US targets. We find that national culture has no significant relations with default risk. 
Finally, we find that mergers financed with shares are negatively related to default risk, but these 
relations are not statistically significant.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the changes in default risk of acquirers after 
completing cross-border mergers. Our study offers several valuable insights. First, we provide 
evidence regarding the external validity of the relevance of managerial issues by examining 
subsamples of both US and non-US acquirers. Second, we examine the impact of the significance 
of cultural factors and geographic distance on post-merger default risk of acquiring firms. Third, 
we present evidence on the impact of institutional factors on post-merger default risk of acquiring 
firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our data and 
methodology.  In section 3, we report the results of our empirical study. Our conclusions are 
offered in the final section.  
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2. Methodology and Data  
2.1 Methodology 
 
We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) in measuring probability of default risk.  Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) report that their distance to default model is superior in hazard models and in out 
of sample forecasts than the existing models.  
We use independent variables that are reported to have significant effects on default risk in 
mergers and as determinants in cross-border mergers. Furfine and Rosen (2011) suggest that 
idiosyncratic risk, valuation errors proxied by past stock performance and market to book ratio, 
firm size and type of payment have significant impact on default risk in domestic mergers. They 
find that idiosyncratic risk increases default risk in domestic mergers. Their results are inconsistent 
with the notion that idiosyncratic risk is related to better information flow and more efficient 
capital investment (Durnev et al., 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007) Following Furfine and Rosen 
(2011) we measure idiosyncratic risk (VOL) as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
component of the acquirer’s stock return estimated over the six month period ending one month 
prior to the merger announcement. Inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, Furfine and 
Rosen find that acquirers with poor past stock performance tend to make risk enhancing domestic 
mergers. Following their methodology, our proxies for valuation errors are the buy and hold return 
of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger 
announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for non US) 
return over the same period (RUNM) and Tobin’s q. Market size (MKTVAL) is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization and we use a dummy for mergers financed at least with 
stocks (SHARES). In addition, we also use a dummy if the acquirer’s industry is the same as the 
target firm’s industry (RELATED). 
Erel et al. (2012) examine the determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. They 
find that geography, the quality of accounting disclosure, and bilateral trade increase the likelihood 
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of mergers between two countries. They also indicate that cultural differences1 play insignificant 
role in cross border mergers which is in stark odds with a recent study (Ahern et al., forthcoming).    
Ahern et al. (forthcoming) examine the role of national cultural values on the pattern of cross-
border merger activity and the gains they create. Using a comprehensive sample of 20,893 cross-
border mergers from 52 different countries over 1991–2008, they find that culture has a significant 
and economically important effect on the volume of cross-border mergers. After controlling for 
country-level fixed effects and a range of country-pair variables such as shared legal origin, 
language, religion, geographic distance they find a strong negative relationship between cultural 
distance and the volume of cross-border merger activity between two countries. Particularly, the 
greater is the cross-country difference between the values of trust, hierarchy, and individualism, 
the smaller is the cross-border merger volume. Likewise, less cultural distance leads to higher 
combined announcement returns in cross-border mergers. Overall, the work of Ahern et al. 
(forthcoming) is consistent with the view that cultural differences impose costly frictions between 
firms leading to fewer mergers.  
We control for country-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as the revised 
antidirector index (ANTIDIR), legal origin (ORIGIN), ownership concentration (OWN), stock 
market capitalization to GDP (STOCKMKTDEV), law enforcement index (ENFORCE), and 
accounting standards, such as the time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), prospectus disclosure 
index (DISC) and periodic filing index (DISCFIL), from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008). We also include the distance between the capital cities of a country pair (GEO).    
We use the uncertainty avoidance score (UAI) from Hofstede (1980, 2001) as our proxy for 
natural cultural value. Uncertainty avoidance is one of the facets of natural cultural attributes 
constructed by Hofstede. Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance score has been used in finance by 
several scholarly works (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010 and Anderson et al., 2011) in their studies 
on the determinants of the home bias. These studies show that institutional investors from high 
                                                 
1 They have different measures of culture variables than Ahern et al.  
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uncertainty avoidance countries invest less in foreign equities, which may be supported by the 
belief that investors may perceive foreign assets to be more risky and hence do not invest in them. 
Venaik and Brewer (2010) posit that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance score principally 
measures the stress component of dealing with uncertain situations. Hofstede (2001) states that 
‘uncertainty avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situations. People in such cultures look for 
structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly 
interpretable and predictable’. He constructed the uncertainty avoidance score using three specific 
survey questions.  These are: 
1. How often do you feel nervous or tense (at work)? (1. Always to 5. Never). 
2. How long do you think you will continue working for this company (or organization)? (1. Two 
year to 5. Until retirement).  
3. Company rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s 
best interest. (1. Strongly agree to 5. Strongly disagree). 
These questions basically capture three features of uncertainty avoidance which are rule 
orientation, employment stability and stress. Responses from these questions are combined into 
one single measure of uncertainty avoidance.  
 
Our industry and year fixed effect regression model is the following: 
DMUt = α + βRUNMt + βVOLt + βQt + βLEVt + βSHARESt + βLNGEOt + βLNMKTVALt  
              + βRELATEDt  + βDUAIt + βDDANTIDIRt + βDDORIGINt  + βDDCHECKt  
              + βDDSTOCKMKTDEVt + βDDDISCt + βDDDISCFILt  
              + βDDENFORCEt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + εt        
 
 
Definition of Variables: 
 
DMU is the change in distance to default probability calculate following Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) DD model.  
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RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers 
and MSCI for non US) return over the same period.  
VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return.  
Q is Tobin’s q.  
LEV is leverage ratio.  
SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock.  
LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s 
country.  
LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the 
month prior to merger announcement.  
RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry.  
DUAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index which is a Hofstede’s culture 
variable, of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.   
DDANTIDIR is a dummy variable if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s 
country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDORIGIN is a dummy variable if the difference between the code for country origin of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDCHECK is a dummy variable if the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in 
the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.    
DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable if the difference between stock market development 
index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDDISC is a dummy variable if the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.  
DDDISCFIL is a dummy variable if the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of 
the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
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DDENFORCE is a dummy variable if the difference between public enforcement index of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.    
 
 2.2 Data 
 
We collect cross-border mergers data from Zephyr database. Following Furfine and Rosen 
(2011), we select only complete deals with minimum ownership of 90%, cash and shares 
acquisition and mergers in non-financial and non-utility industries for the period from 1996 to 
2012. From Zephyr, we obtain the announcement dates, types of payment and industry of 
acquirers and target firms. Firm financial data are obtained from Osiris database and stock return 
data are taken from Datastream. We use data from Osiris and Datstream to measure proxies for 
idiosyncratic risk (VOL), valuation errors (RUNM and M/B ratio), leverage (LEV), market value 
(MKTVAL) and default risk (Z-score). We obtain data on country level governance and 
accounting standards such as the revised antidirector index (ANTIDIR), country of origin 
(ORIGIN), time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), ownership concentration (OWN), stock 
market development (SOCKMKTDEV), prospectus disclosure index (DISC), periodic filling 
index (DISCFIL) and enforcement index (ENFORCE) from Djankov et al. (2008). We acquire 
data on national culture (UAI) from Hofstede’s website. Following Erel et al. (2012), we calculate 
the distance between capital cities of a country pair (GEO) from mapsofworld.com. We then 
merge these samples and drop the missing observations. After deleting observations with missing 
variables, the final sample consists of 1,407 firm year observations.  
 
3. Empirical Results  
9 
 
We provide descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 12.  In Panel A, we describe features of 
our total sample. In subsequent panels, we provide details of subsamples based on whether the 
acquirers and targets are US or non US firms.  For the overall sample, we find that default risk 
decreases after cross-border mergers. Also, most mergers are related mergers and are cash 
transactions. The median geographic distance between headquarters of acquirers and targets is 
approximately 3,700 miles. Targets countries typically have higher uncertainty avoidance scores 
than acquirer countries. Targets countries and acquirer countries are generally from similar legal 
origin and have nearly same antidirector index values. Typically, it takes longer to collect bounced 
checks in target countries than acquirer countries.  In general, acquiring countries have better 
developed stock markets and have higher disclosure index than target countries.  
In table 2, we report the correlation between key variables used in the study. Most 
correlation values, except for country-level governance variables, are small and do not have a 
potential for multicollinearity.  The strong correlations among country-level governance variables 
preclude us from using these variables simultaneously in our multiple regressions.    
We regress the change in default risk measured by DMU, the change in distance to default 
probability, on a number of independent variables capturing firm specific factors, culture, 
geographic distance and institutional quality.  The results for the total sample are provided in 
Table 3, while subsample results are reported in Tables 4 through 6.  The results from Table 3 
reveal several interesting findings. First, it appears that idiosyncratic risk (VOL), managerial issues 
(RUNM) and geographic distance (LNGEO) significantly affect the post-merger default risk in the 
case of cross-border mergers. Consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, firms with good past 
stock performance are likely to engage in risky acquisitions. The negative VOL is consistent with 
the notion that high idiosyncratic risk means better information flows which result in more 
efficient mergers that reduce default risk. Geographic distance between the two countries is 
                                                 
2 All variables except the distance to default probability variable are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to control 
for outliers. 
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positively related to default risk. Second, firm size (LNMKTVAL) and culture (DUAI) do not 
seem to have any significant effect on post-merger default risk. The results also show that 
institutional quality does not have any significant effect on default risk.  
We report results of subsample of US acquirers and international targets in Table 4.  The 
results are similar to those in total sample. First, past stock performance and idiosyncratic 
volatility affect the post-merger default risk in the case of cross-border mergers. Second, when 
acquiring firms are large post-merger default risk tends to go down. In Table 5, we report results of 
subsample of international acquirers and US targets. There is strong evidence that geographic 
distance increases default risk with international acquirers and US target firms. This result is 
exactly opposite to that reported in Table 4 for the case of US acquirers.  Our findings suggest that 
international acquirers do not overpay or act in an overconfident manner when using shares as the 
medium of exchange.  
 Finally in Table 6, we report results of subsample of international acquirers and 
international targets. Our results show that idiosyncratic risk, geographic distance and firm size 
matter when it comes to post-merger default risk.   
 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the impact of cross-border acquisitions on post-merger default risk. Our 
major finding is that managerial factors and geographic distance do play significant roles in 
affecting post-merger default risk. In contrast to the findings of Furfine and Rosen (2011) we find 
that managerial incentives in cross border mergers are different from those in domestic mergers.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Total sample 
MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX
DMU -0.009 0.118 -0.862 -0.506 0.000 0.362 0.839
RUNM 0.002 0.090 -0.276 -0.230 -0.001 0.259 0.287
VOL 0.021 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.018 0.069 0.084
GEO (Miles) 3,177 2,503 153 156 3,669 10,557 10,557
MKTVAL (US$ th) 11,142,208 30,880,233 8,875 12,389 1,804,288 149,743,810 277,060,300
TOBIN 2.098 1.360 0.458 0.597 1.693 7.521 9.165
SHARES 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEV 0.658 0.983 -3.939 -1.799 0.459 5.312 6.337
RELATED 0.594 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
UAI -3.675 26.114 -65.500 -59.000 -2.000 61.000 63.000
DANTIDIR 0.274 1.448 -2.500 -2.455 0.000 4.000 4.000
DORIGIN 0.124 0.652 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DCHECK -0.110 1.151 -2.594 -2.480 -0.252 2.379 2.480
DSTOCKMKTDEV 9.914 78.883 -291.806 -212.558 15.560 195.772 317.656
DDISC 0.083 0.339 -0.610 -0.580 0.080 1.000 1.000
DDISCFIL 0.065 0.328 -0.800 -0.600 0.000 0.800 0.800
DENFORCE -0.035 0.639 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000  
 
Panel B. US acquirers and International targets 
MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX
DMU -0.009 0.080 -0.508 -0.244 0.000 0.297 0.483
RUNM 0.010 0.082 -0.207 -0.204 0.006 0.258 0.259
VOL 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.052 0.054
GEO (Miles) 3,667 1,875 458 458 3,835 9,917 9,917
MKTVAL (US$ th) 18,209,133 47,559,564 43,825 43,825 2,641,302 277,060,300 277,060,300
TOBIN 2.422 1.564 0.761 0.767 1.962 9.130 9.165
SHARES 0.085 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEV 0.655 0.862 0.000 0.000 0.435 5.107 5.312
RELATED 0.619 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
UAI -7.691 20.117 -48.000 -48.000 -2.000 23.000 23.000
DANTIDIR -0.952 1.002 -2.000 -2.000 -1.000 2.000 2.000
DORIGIN 0.483 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DCHECK -1.118 0.700 -2.594 -2.510 -1.048 0.325 0.325
DSTOCKMKTDEV 35.534 51.012 -106.818 -106.818 35.960 125.746 125.746
DDISC 0.321 0.233 0.080 0.080 0.250 1.000 1.000
DDISCFIL 0.212 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.800
DENFORCE -0.458 0.445 -1.000 -1.000 -0.500 0.000 0.000  
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Panel C. International acquirers and US targets 
MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX
DMU -0.005 0.115 -0.712 -0.382 0.000 0.365 0.839
RUNM -0.005 0.095 -0.276 -0.275 -0.009 0.220 0.222
VOL 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.070 0.072
GEO (Miles) 3779.360 2049.465 458.153 458.153 3668.508 9917.039 9917.039
MKTVAL (US  13583702.728 31290215.384 11986.560 12177.055 2035989.000 145201457.929 147383140.260
TOBIN 2.156 1.316 0.610 0.619 1.792 7.820 7.842
SHARES 0.164 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEV 0.714 1.058 -1.822 -1.673 0.456 5.734 5.741
RELATED 0.568 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
UAI 4.457 18.769 -23.000 -23.000 2.000 48.000 48.000
DANTIDIR 1.220 0.819 -1.000 -1.000 1.000 2.000 2.000
DORIGIN -0.295 0.457 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DCHECK 1.101 0.709 -0.325 -0.325 0.799 2.480 2.480
DSTOCKMKT -26.536 48.557 -108.336 -108.336 -35.960 106.818 106.818
DDISC -0.236 0.140 -0.610 -0.593 -0.170 -0.080 -0.080
DDISCFIL -0.126 0.207 -0.800 -0.800 0.000 0.000 0.000
DENFORCE 0.444 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000  
Panel D.  . International (non US) acquirers and International (non US) targets  
MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX
DMU -0.011 0.136 -0.862 -0.720 -0.001 0.389 0.831
RUNM 0.001 0.092 -0.230 -0.224 -0.004 0.283 0.287
VOL 0.022 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.083 0.084
GEO (Miles) 2,586 2,869 153 155 995 10,557 10,557
MKTVAL (US$ th) 5,925,353 12,641,847 8,875 8,877 1,316,647 77,832,268 78,816,531
TOBIN 1.887 1.218 0.458 0.461 1.531 7.457 7.521
SHARES 0.172 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEV 0.631 1.005 -3.939 -3.062 0.481 6.121 6.337
RELATED 0.593 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
UAI -5.766 31.047 -65.500 -65.125 -7.000 63.000 63.000
DANTIDIR 0.452 1.457 -2.500 -2.500 0.000 4.000 4.000
DORIGIN 0.148 0.688 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DCHECK -0.194 0.935 -2.314 -2.298 -0.272 2.379 2.379
DSTOCKMKTDEV 15.060 95.911 -291.806 -291.806 24.968 317.656 317.656
DDISC 0.120 0.335 -0.583 -0.581 0.080 1.000 1.000
DDISCFIL 0.085 0.360 -0.600 -0.600 0.000 0.800 0.800
DENFORCE -0.054 0.643 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000  
DMU is the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s 
stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the 
market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for non US) return over the same period. VOL is the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. GEO is the distance 
between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring firm in 
the merger announcement year. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed 
at least partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is 
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the same as the acquirer’s industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index 
of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DORIGIN is the difference between the code for 
country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DCHECK is the difference 
between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. 
DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer’s and that of 
the target’s country.  DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s 
country and that of the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling 
index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DENFORCE is the difference between 
public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. 
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Table 2:  Correlation matrix 
Panel A. Total sample 
RUNM VOL GEO (Miles)TVAL (US$ TOBIN SHARES LEV RELATED UAI DANTIDIR DORIGIN DCHECK TOCKMKTD DDISC DDISCFIL
VOL -0.129
GEO (Miles) -0.009 0.027
MKTVAL (US$ th) 0.048 -0.186 0.072
TOBIN 0.053 -0.100 -0.018 0.229
SHARES -0.043 0.251 -0.031 -0.061 -0.015
LEV -0.016 -0.020 -0.011 0.051 -0.087 0.002
RELATED 0.013 -0.050 0.000 -0.054 -0.014 -0.004 -0.026
UAI 0.007 -0.054 0.084 0.067 -0.044 -0.041 0.021 0.021
DANTIDIR -0.036 0.140 -0.025 -0.060 -0.074 0.069 -0.022 -0.038 -0.277
DORIGIN 0.028 0.029 -0.060 -0.011 0.043 0.013 -0.038 0.011 -0.647 0.321 1.000
DCHECK -0.047 0.041 0.037 -0.024 -0.035 0.082 0.015 -0.039 0.333 0.161 -0.327 1.000
DSTOCKMKTDEV 0.017 0.051 -0.018 0.000 0.048 0.005 -0.020 0.006 -0.513 0.183 0.498 -0.429 1.000
DDISC 0.015 0.061 -0.012 -0.010 -0.003 -0.023 -0.014 0.020 -0.392 0.123 0.711 -0.511 0.570
DDISCFIL 0.026 -0.019 0.001 -0.018 0.014 -0.024 -0.023 0.038 -0.381 0.165 0.721 -0.287 0.414 0.652
DENFORCE -0.031 0.112 0.103 -0.011 -0.079 0.063 0.004 -0.087 0.226 0.168 -0.341 0.632 -0.378 -0.355 -0.484  
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Panel B. US acquirers and International targets 
RUNM VOL GEO (MilesKTVAL (US$ t TOBIN SHARES LEV RELATED UAI DANTIDIR DORIGIN DCHECK TOCKMKTD DDISC DDISCFIL
VOL -0.062
GEO (Miles) -0.009 0.047
MKTVAL (US$ th 0.033 -0.213 0.046
TOBIN 0.061 -0.071 -0.084 0.263
SHARES 0.007 0.357 -0.034 0.074 0.067
LEV -0.033 -0.112 -0.011 0.117 -0.137 0.021
RELATED 0.008 -0.012 0.049 -0.096 -0.082 -0.035 0.023
UAI 0.063 -0.131 -0.106 0.108 0.018 -0.011 0.022 -0.076
DANTIDIR 0.007 0.082 0.120 -0.027 -0.042 0.071 0.019 -0.001 -0.414
DORIGIN -0.006 0.053 0.300 -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.026 0.077 -0.636 0.684
DCHECK 0.014 -0.052 0.346 0.041 -0.051 -0.073 -0.008 -0.047 0.302 -0.282 0.045
DSTOCKMKTDEV 0.005 0.167 0.105 -0.026 -0.068 0.059 -0.005 0.044 -0.587 0.423 0.515 -0.371
DDISC 0.002 0.091 0.410 0.044 -0.099 0.012 0.009 0.086 -0.389 0.554 0.738 0.057 0.568
DDISCFIL 0.021 0.016 0.224 -0.059 -0.066 -0.020 -0.015 0.119 -0.420 0.387 0.734 0.030 0.451 0.727
DENFORCE -0.009 -0.050 0.332 0.043 0.007 0.003 0.026 -0.065 0.330 -0.220 -0.190 0.601 -0.417 -0.123 -0.334  
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Panel C. International acquirers and US targets 
RUNM VOL GEO (Miles) MKTVAL (US$ th) Q SHARES LEV RELATED UAI DANTIDIR DORIGIN DCHECK DSTOCKMKTDEV DDISC DDISCFIL
VOL -0.223
GEO (Miles) 0.055 -0.105
MKTVAL (US$ th) 0.082 -0.228 0.066
Q 0.011 -0.006 -0.002 0.260
SHARES -0.064 0.364 -0.116 -0.142 -0.093
LEV 0.010 -0.023 -0.021 0.025 -0.040 -0.027
RELATED 0.027 0.016 0.021 -0.066 -0.011 0.007 -0.025
UAI -0.004 -0.078 0.015 -0.011 0.000 -0.095 -0.018 0.023
DANTIDIR -0.019 0.120 -0.052 0.085 0.022 0.023 -0.027 -0.027 -0.518
DORIGIN 0.035 0.095 -0.096 0.098 -0.019 0.056 0.014 -0.009 -0.588 0.682
DCHECK 0.042 -0.016 -0.020 0.008 -0.029 0.053 0.043 -0.010 0.212 -0.359 0.176
DSTOCKMKTDEV -0.029 0.080 0.000 -0.050 0.002 0.058 0.087 0.018 -0.502 0.205 0.176 -0.239
DDISC -0.105 0.132 -0.372 -0.223 -0.018 0.064 0.099 -0.026 -0.040 -0.013 -0.026 0.002 0.022
DDISCFIL 0.068 -0.013 -0.051 0.074 -0.061 -0.021 0.012 0.035 -0.246 0.462 0.718 0.190 0.142 -0.052
DENFORCE -0.002 -0.043 -0.006 -0.015 -0.035 0.055 -0.027 -0.033 0.263 -0.363 -0.039 0.694 -0.393 -0.009 -0.243  
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Panel D.  . International (non US) acquirers and International (non US) targets 
RUNM VOL GEO (Miles)TVAL (US$ TOBIN SHARES LEV RELATED UAI DANTIDIR DORIGIN DCHECK TOCKMKTD DDISC DDISCFIL
VOL -0.095
GEO (Miles) -0.037 0.097
MKTVAL (US$ th) 0.043 -0.193 0.038
TOBIN 0.062 -0.138 -0.064 0.070
SHARES -0.041 0.149 0.023 -0.152 0.019
LEV -0.022 0.012 -0.018 -0.008 -0.095 0.011
RELATED 0.004 -0.094 -0.025 -0.003 0.026 0.009 -0.048
UAI 0.009 -0.043 0.119 0.135 -0.095 -0.048 0.026 0.066
DANTIDIR -0.002 0.104 -0.032 -0.081 -0.030 0.007 -0.060 -0.029 -0.431
DORIGIN -0.005 0.069 -0.133 -0.179 0.063 0.073 -0.049 -0.036 -0.661 0.757
DCHECK -0.039 -0.011 -0.065 -0.059 0.051 0.075 -0.020 -0.011 0.323 -0.368 -0.123
DSTOCKMKTDEV 0.009 0.057 -0.018 0.041 0.097 0.010 -0.044 -0.025 -0.471 0.444 0.467 -0.349
DDISC -0.016 0.150 -0.004 -0.072 -0.015 0.017 -0.023 -0.030 -0.403 0.761 0.703 -0.251 0.567
DDISCFIL -0.020 0.015 -0.016 -0.095 0.048 0.017 -0.023 -0.013 -0.344 0.488 0.640 -0.112 0.355 0.615
DENFORCE 0.002 0.163 0.078 0.012 -0.100 0.025 -0.013 -0.104 0.100 -0.079 -0.176 0.336 -0.236 -0.071 -0.405  
DMU is the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the 
merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for non US) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the 
idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. GEO is the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring 
firm in the merger announcement year. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. RELATED is 
a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and 
that of the target’s country. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DORIGIN is the difference 
between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DCHECK is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer’s and that of the target’s 
country.  DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure 
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in periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DENFORCE is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and 
that of the target’s country.  
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 Table 3. Cross-sectional  Regressions: Determinants of Change in Risk Following Cross-Border 
Mergers for the total sample 
RUNM 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
VOL -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.746) (0.755) (0.766) (0.746) (0.746) (0.747) (0.791) (0.760) (0.784) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.311) (0.302) (0.319) (0.309) (0.311) (0.311) (0.303) (0.313) (0.306) 
SHARES -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.139) (0.122) (0.146) (0.135) (0.138) (0.140) (0.130) (0.140) (0.124) 
GEO 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
MKTVAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.111) (0.140) (0.104) (0.116) (0.112) (0.111) (0.101) (0.117) (0.136) 
RELATED 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.863) (0.918) (0.859) (0.902) (0.866) (0.864) (0.872) (0.912) (0.966) 
DUAI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.759) (0.614) (0.958) (0.892) (0.868) (0.772) (0.949) (0.919) (0.859) 
DDANTIDIR 
 
0.000 
   
 
  
0.000 
  
(0.249) 
   
 
  
(0.251) 
DDORIGIN 
  
0.000 
  
 
  
0.000 
   
(0.519) 
  
 
  
(0.627) 
DDCHECK 
   
0.000 
 
 
  
0.000 
    
(0.400) 
 
 
  
(0.491) 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV 
    
0.000  
  
0.000 
     
(0.903)  
  
(0.928) 
DDDISC 
     
0.000  
 
0.001 
      
(0.989)  
 
(0.219) 
DDDISCFIL 
     
 0.000  -0.001 
      
 (0.224)  (0.246) 
DDENFORCE 
     
 
 
0.000 0.000 
      
 
 
(0.591) (0.946) 
      
 
   
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      
 
   
N 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 
R-squared 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.055 
The dependent variable is DMU, defined as the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is 
the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for 
non US) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable 
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is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance 
between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable 
if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. DDANTIDIR is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country is the 
same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDORIGIN is a dummy variable of one if 
the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater 
than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDCHECK is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than 
that of the target’s country, else zero. DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that 
of the target’s country, else zero.  DDISC is a dummy variable of one if the difference between 
prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DDISCFIL is a dummy variable of one if the difference between disclosure in 
periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DDENFORCE is a dummy variable of one if the difference between public 
enforcement index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, 
else zero.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Change in Risk Following Cross-border mergers:  US acquirers vs. 
International targets 
RUNM 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VOL -0.280*** -0.284*** -0.281*** -0.282*** -0.280*** -0.275*** -0.282*** -0.281*** -0.280*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.449) (0.442) (0.437) (0.406) (0.451) (0.498) (0.447) (0.442) (0.507) 
LEV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.120 (0.137) (0.117) (0.131) (0.121) (0.106) (0.119) (0.117) (0.145) 
SHARES -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.463) (0.403) (0.461) (0.459) (0.464) (0.502) (0.465) (0.457) (0.383) 
GEO 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
 
(0.218) (0.406) (0.260) (0.279) (0.218) (0.069) (0.221) (0.279) (0.089) 
MKTVAL -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.028) (0.030) (0.059) 
RELATED -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.153) (0.172) (0.156) (0.170) (0.153) (0.168) (0.161) (0.164) (0.221) 
DUAI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.996) (0.721) (0.852) (0.873) (0.985) (0.550) (0.883) (0.768) (0.589) 
DDANTIDIR 
 
0.001 
   
 
  
0.003* 
  
(0.288) 
   
 
  
(0.090) 
DORIGIN 
  
0.000 
  
 
  
-0.001 
   
(0.784) 
  
 
  
(0.723) 
DDCHECK 
   
0.001 
 
 
  
0.000 
    
(0.449) 
 
 
  
(0.958) 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV 
    
0.000  
  
0.001 
     
(0.982)  
  
(0.368) 
DDISC 
     
-0.003  
 
-0.007** 
      
(0.161)  
 
(0.033) 
DDISCFIL 
     
 -0.001  0.002 
      
 (0.778)  (0.392) 
DDENFORCE 
     
 
 
0.001 0.000 
      
 
 
(0.634) (0.874) 
      
 
   
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      
 
   
N 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.161 0.164 0.162 0.163 0.161 0.166 0.162 0.162 0.178 
The dependent variable is DMU, defined as the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is 
the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for 
non US) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable 
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is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance 
between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable 
if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. DDANTIDIR is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country is the 
same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DORIGIN is the difference between the 
code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DDCHECK is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference between stock market development 
index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.  
DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country and that of 
the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDENFORCE is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than 
that of the target’s country, else zero.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Change in Risk Following Cross-border mergers:  International acquirers 
and US targets  
RUNM 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.716) (0.717) (0.672) (0.717) (0.719) (0.714) (0.669) (0.727) (0.677) 
VOL -0.058 -0.058 -0.056 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.053 -0.058 -0.053 
 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.144) (0.134) (0.136) (0.131) (0.163) (0.127) (0.168) 
Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.215) (0.216) (0.202) (0.215) (0.216) (0.215) (0.196) (0.212) (0.194) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.504) (0.505) (0.484) (0.499) (0.483) (0.489) (0.519) (0.513) (0.503) 
SHARES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.629) (0.631) (0.668) (0.632) (0.612) (0.650) (0.629) (0.648) (0.674) 
GEO 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
MKTVAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.337) (0.337) (0.290) (0.334) (0.355) (0.337) (0.312) (0.338) (0.319) 
RELATED 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.577) (0.578) (0.555) (0.579) (0.568) (0.574) (0.500) (0.596) (0.516) 
DUAI 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.665) (0.666) (0.411) (0.641) (0.571) (0.645) (0.458) (0.870) (0.749) 
DDANTIDIR 
 
0.000 
   
 
  
0.001 
  
(0.958) 
   
 
  
(0.763) 
DDORIGIN 
  
-0.001 
  
 
  
0.000 
   
(0.332) 
  
 
  
(0.905) 
DDCHECK 
   
0.000 
 
 
  
0.000 
    
(0.781) 
 
 
  
(0.890) 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV 
    
0.000  
  
0.000 
     
(0.712)  
  
(0.948) 
DDISC 
     
-0.001  
 
-0.002 
      
(0.755)  
 
(0.697) 
DDISCFIL 
     
 -0.001  -0.001 
      
 (0.186)  (0.448) 
DENFORCE 
     
 
 
0.000 0.000 
      
 
 
(0.754) (0.765) 
      
 
   
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      
 
   
N 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.139 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.142 0.137 0.142 
The dependent variable is DMU, defined as the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is 
the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for 
non US) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
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of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable 
is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance 
between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable 
if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. DDANTIDIR is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country is the 
same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDORIGIN is a dummy variable of one if 
the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater 
than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDCHECK is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than 
that of the target’s country, else zero. DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that 
of the target’s country, else zero.  DDISC is a dummy variable of one if the difference between 
prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DDISCFIL is a dummy variable of one if the difference between disclosure in 
periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DENFORCE is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s 
country and that of the target’s country.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Determinants of Change in Risk Following Cross-border mergers:  International (non US) 
acquirers and International (non US) targets  
RUNM 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.889) (0.861) (0.889) (0.906) (0.891) (0.892) (0.883) (0.905) (0.922) 
VOL -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.443) (0.463) (0.443) (0.395) (0.453) (0.443) (0.450) (0.432) (0.385) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.594) (0.577) (0.596) (0.616) (0.583) (0.593) (0.598) (0.590) (0.591) 
SHARES -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.271) (0.275) (0.271) (0.275) (0.257) (0.272) (0.268) (0.273) (0.258) 
GEO 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.042) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.041) 
MKTVAL -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) 
RELATED 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.333) (0.348) (0.333) (0.315) (0.333) (0.333) (0.337) (0.369) (0.379) 
DUAI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.538) (0.679) (0.562) (0.739) (0.755) (0.561) (0.607) (0.483) (0.849) 
DANTIDIR 
 
0.000 
   
 
  
0.000 
  
(0.629) 
   
 
  
(0.718) 
DORIGIN 
  
0.000 
  
 
  
0.000 
   
(0.974) 
  
 
  
(0.857) 
DCHECK 
   
0.000 
 
 
  
0.000 
    
(0.413) 
 
 
  
(0.363) 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV 
    
0.000  
  
0.000 
     
(0.648)  
  
(0.640) 
DDISC 
     
0.000  
 
0.000 
      
(0.956)  
 
(0.742) 
DDISCFIL 
     
 0.000  0.000 
      
 (0.863)  (0.843) 
DENFORCE 
     
 
 
0.000 0.000 
      
 
 
(0.619) (0.392) 
      
 
   
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      
 
   
N 676 676 676 676 676 676 676 676 676 
R-squared 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.098 
          
The dependent variable is DMU, defined as the change in distance to default probability. RUNM is 
the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500 for US acquirers and MSCI for 
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non US) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable 
is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance 
between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable 
if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. DDANTIDIR is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country is the 
same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDORIGIN is a dummy variable of one if 
the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater 
than that of the target’s country, else zero.  DDCHECK is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than 
that of the target’s country, else zero. DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that 
of the target’s country, else zero.  DDISC is a dummy variable of one if the difference between 
prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DDISCFIL is a dummy variable of one if the difference between disclosure in 
periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero. DDENFORCE is a dummy variable of one if the difference between public 
enforcement index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, 
else zero.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
 
